ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT GREEK LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS

Volume 2
G–O

General Editor
Georgios K. Giannakis

Associate Editors
Vit Bubenik
Emilio Crespo
Chris Golston
Alexandra Lianeri
Silvia Luraghi
Stephanos Matthaios

BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2014
Table of Contents

**Volume One**

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... vii
List of Contributors ....................................................................................................................................... xi
Table of Contents Ordered by Thematic Category ............................................................................... xv
Transcription, Abbreviations, Bibliography ........................................................................................... xxi
List of Illustrations ....................................................................................................................................... xxiii
Articles A–F ..................................................................................................................................................... 1

**Volume Two**

Transcription, Abbreviations, Bibliography ........................................................................................... vii
Articles G–O .................................................................................................................................................... 1

**Volume Three**

Transcription, Abbreviations, Bibliography ........................................................................................... vii
Articles P–Z ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
Index .................................................................................................................................................................. 547
Some imported Latin suffixes display remarkable similarity to pre-existing Greek ones, which were thus ‘revived’ (e.g. Gk. -tōr/-tor ~ Lat. -tor: e.g. dōtōr ‘giver’ vs. lectōr ‘reader’; cf. also Gk. -inos ~ Lat. -inus, Gk. -ikós ~ Lat. -icus, Gk. -anōs ~ Lat. -anus, etc.). In general, it is rather natural to find in Greek (esp. in documentary papyri) a form consisting of a Greek stem + Latin suffix (e.g. mékhánāríos from mékhanaí ‘machine’) next to a form of the type Latin(ate) loan stem + Greek suffix (e.g. kastellítēs from castellum + -itēs ‘camp soldier’). Obviously such forms could well have been coined within Latin first, as mentioned above in the case of Lat. dromedarius vs. Gk. dromédarios ‘camel-driver’. Sometimes, we may even find composite Graeco-Latin suffixes, an epitome of Graeco-Latin morphological fusion, e.g. besti-ar-ītēs ‘clothes-bearer, etc.’ (from uestia-rius + -(ē)tēs); but conversely, note also meth(e)-l-it-ārīos ‘butcher(?)’ (cf. Palmer 1945:6–8; Cavennále 1952:199–202).

**Bibliography**


other word-final long vowels and diphthongs like heavy -VV# rhymes, e.g. paideúoi, paideúisai like paideúo ‘I am educating’. Note that the -oi of locatival adverbs such as oikóì ‘at home’ are also treated as -VV# rhymes, but the evidence comes from the non-application of the Sotera Rule, not the Law of Limitation.

A small class of exceptions to the Law of Limitation arose in Attic and Ionic when speakers retained the proparoxytone → accentuation of words in which quantitative → metathesis produced a heavy final syllable. These include genitives of i- and u-stems, e.g. póleos (Homer) > póleós ‘(of the) city’, *ásteos > ásteos ‘(of the) town’, some nouns and adjectives belonging to the → Attic Declension, e.g. *hileós > hileós ‘propitious’, and → Ionic first declension gen. sg. forms of the type *Atreídēo > Atreídēo ‘son of Atreus’; taken at face value, póleós shows that the Law of Limitation was already active before the last compositional phase of the Homeric epics (Wackernagel 1893:33–33).

The Law of Limitation essentially determines the domain of the word within which an accent is phonologically licit. Where the accent is located within that domain depends primarily on morphological and lexical factors. Words whose accent always falls at the left edge of that domain, such as those cited above, are referred to as exhibiting ‘recessive’ accent. These include entire classes of words, e.g. virtually all finite verbs, athematic neuter nouns, feminine verbal nouns in -sis (e.g. mímēsis ‘imitation’; → Action Nouns), left-headed verbal/prepositional governing compounds (e.g. phulokláx ‘fond of flatterers’; → Compound Nouns), etc. While it is possible that the accentable domain is independent of other rhythmic phonological structure (Devine & Stephens 1994:154), it is more likely (aligned with) a phonological constituent reflected elsewhere in the grammar → Prosody). A number of suggestions have been made (cf. Probert 2010 with refs.), including equating the span between the accent (’) and word-end (#), which consists of two light syllables (LL, e.g. heurémata), a heavy syllable (H, e.g. heurémátōn), or a heavy-light sequence (HL#, e.g. heuréma) – in other words, ‘LL# or ‘H(L)# – with a quantity-insensitive trochaic foot (Sauzet 1989) or a quantity-sensitive one (Golston 1990). This prosodic-phonological constituent may also be reflected in word formation (Gunkel 2011) and meter (Golston & Riad 2000; 2005; Gunkel 2010:43–75).

The Law of Limitation either arose in Proto-Greek (→ Proto-Greek and Common Greek) or spread across all of the dialects for which we have accentual evidence (Probert 2006:72–74). Until that point, the phonologically accentable domain consisted of the entire word, as in Vedic. The Law of Limitation is thus a distinctive feature of Greek. From a phonological point of view, the change took place when speakers regularized the post-accentual fall in pitch by aligning it with word-end (Garrett 2006:141), or with a constituent such as a foot that was itself aligned with word end. The regular falling pitch at word-end may have facilitated the merger of word-final *m and *n > n and the loss of word-final stops, e.g. acc. sg. *om > *on, 3pl. *ont > -on (Garrett 2006:141). It has recently been argued that the change was itself facilitated by the fact that the location of the accent in a high proportion of early Greek words (by type and token) already obeyed the Law of Limitation before it arose (Probert 2012).

Bibliography
Legal Terminology

Unlike Rome, Ancient Greece did not produce jurists, so the nature of its legal documents is more akin to commentaries than casebooks. Classical Athenian law is the best documented, while information on the laws of other city-states is scarce and is often preserved only in Athenian texts. Most of our knowledge of Athenian legal terms and procedures comes from the works of the great Athenian orators of the 4th and 5th centuries BCE, collectively known as the ‘Canon of Ten’: Aeschines, Andocides, Antiphon, Demosthenes, Dinarchus, Hyperides, Isaeus, Isocrates, Lycurgus, and Lysias.

Ancient Greek legal terms themselves are often not specifically coined to describe a particular process, person, or legal body, but are often, rather, more general terms that are given a specific meaning in a legal context. Indeed, the word for ‘law’ itself, nómōs, is also the word for ‘custom’ and this creates a degree of ambiguity, even within legal texts. There are many examples of such ambiguity in Athenian legal terminology, however, which is no doubt due in part to the lack of a juridical tradition, mentioned above. For example, ekklēsia (‘assembly’); a collective noun of those who were ékklētoi, ‘selected to judge’ < verb ekkalō, ‘call out’) in the context of the Athenian legal system came to refer to the assembly held on the Pnyx, at which all citizens could comment and vote upon proposals. The term boulē, which literally means ‘will’, ‘design’, or ‘counsel’ (cf. verb boúlōmai, ‘wish, be willing’) came to refer to the council of citizens, which (after the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7) prepared the agenda for the ekklēsia and, among other administrative duties, decided whether indictments brought against public officials (cf. the concept of impeachment in American politics) would be heard by the ekklēsia or another body called the dikastērion. So too, hoi héndeka, or ‘The Eleven’, came to refer to the committee in charge of Athens’ state prison and which oversaw all executions.

There were also terms borrowed from other sources or that described a social relationship that took on a legal dimension as the Athenian legal system developed. An example is the kinship term kúrios, or ‘lord, master’ (‘sovereign’ in certain contexts), which was adopted into Athenian legal language to denote a woman’s legal representative. In Athens, women were legally minors and so could not represent themselves in court, own property in their own names, or participate in an official transaction. Thus, a male kúrios (often rendered as ‘guardian’ in this context) would oversee these affairs for her. A married woman would have her husband act as kúrios, while an unmarried woman would have either her father or, if he had died, a paternal uncle as her kúrios. Such situations were the norm, although there are recorded instances of an adult son acting as his mother’s kúrios.

Just as the names for different bodies or individuals often existed prior to the legal entities they came to name, the terms for the different kinds of legal actions one could take took their names from the processes themselves. Let us begin with dikē, a term with many meanings derived from the verb deíknumi (‘show, bring to light’). Generally, it is rendered as ‘right’, ‘good order’, ‘justice’, or ‘judgment’. If used specifically as a legal term, it can refer to the process by which a settlement is reached: thus ‘trial’, ‘the case a person pleads (i.e., at trial)’, and ‘lawsuit’. It also may refer to a specific kind of lawsuit, that is, a ‘private suit’ or one that could only be brought by the injured person or that person’s immediate representative.

There were many different kinds of dikai or private suits, depending upon the nature of the legal action required by the circumstance. For example, the dikē émmēnos, or ‘monthly suit’ (really, ‘month-long suit’), could be used to negotiate most financial cases by the second half of the fourth century BCE. It was thought that the term émmēnos (‘month-long’) referred to the maximum length of time allowed in the prosecution of the case, but some scholars have recently suggested that the term émmēnos refers instead to the fact that there was an opportunity to file a case of this type every month. A suit involving a merchant who imported goods is called an emporikē dikē, where emporikē refers specifically to one who imports goods.